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GENUINENESS OF SIGNATURES UNDER THE NEGOTIABLE
INSTRUMENTS LAW AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE
Credit Equipment Corporation v. Steiner
112 Ohio App. 293, 175 N.E.2d 842 (1959)
The plaintiff corporation sued on three trade acceptances, allegedly
made by the defendants and endorsed by the payee to plaintiff. Defendants
denied execution and delivery of the acceptances in their 'answer, and
plaintiff established that it had bought the acceptances for value before the
due dates appearing on the instruments. Introducing no evidence as to the
genuineness of the signatures, plaintiff rested its case. Upon the close of
plaintiff's evidence, defendant's motion for judgment was granted and this
order was affirmed on appeal. The court of appeals, relying on the Nego-
tiable Instruments Law, held that when the defendant denies execution
of the instrument in his answer, the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff
to establish the validity of the defendant's signature.1
Thus, under the rule of this case, the plaintiff must prove the validity
of fhe defendant's signature if denied in the answer. If plaintiff introduces
no evidence bearing on execution, a verdict may properly be directed for
the defendant on this issue 2 The NIL makes no express provision regard-
ing the burden of proof as to signatures, but Ohio and the states which
follow the NIL have uniformly held in the manner of the instant case.3
The current Ohio Revised Code provisions state that the plaintiff holds
the burden of proof as to all matters bearing on successful recovery.4 He
must overcome all defenses interposed including invalid execution which is
a defense not frequently encountered.
The Uniform Commercial Code5 has been adopted in Ohio and will
1 For cases in Ohio, following the NIL, see Yates v. Bates, 34 Ohio L. Abs. 378
(Ct. App., 1941); Buck v. Coblentz, 18 Ohio L. Abs. 1 (Ct. App., 1934); Exchange
National Bank v. Clark, 12 Ohio App. 354 (1920); Discount and Deposit State Bank
v. Litt, S Ohio App. 439, 26 Ohio C.C.R. (N.S.) 145 (1916); Ohio Rev. Code § 1301.25
(1953).
2 In support of the instant case, see: Yates v. Bates, supra note 1; Buck v. Cob-
lentz, supra note 1; Exchange National Bank v. Clark, supra note 1; Discount and
Deposit State Bank v. Litt, supra note 1; Carrara Paint Agency v. American National
Bank of Barberton, 9 Ohio C.C.R. (N.S.) 150 (1906).
3 Hawkins v. Rieman, 73 Ind. App. 127, 125 N.E. 410 (1919); Farmington State
Bank v. Delaney, 167 Minn. 394, 209 N.W. 311 (1926); Wight v. Citizens Bank, 71
N.M. 171 (1912); Murphy v. Skinner, 160 Wis. 554, 152 N.W. 172; Beutel's Brannan,
Negotiable Instruments Law 466-467 (1948); Britton, Bills and Notes 344 (1961).
4 Applebaum v. Smith, 99 Ohio App. 93, 58 Ohio Op. 195 (1954); Citizens
National Bank v. Tabor, 24 Ohio L. Abs. 52 (Ct. App., 1936); Exchange National Bank
v. Clark, supra note 1; Regan v. Sherman, 1 Ohio App. 273 (1913); Ohio Rev. Code
§ 1301.54 (1953).
5 American Law Institute Uniform Commecial Code, Text and Comments Ed.
280-282 (1957).
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go into effect as of July 1, 1962.0 The UCC will change the law with
yespect to the instant case and the procedure as to proof of signatures
because it provides that:
(1) Unless specifically denied in the pleadings, each signature
on an instrument is admitted. When the effectiveness of a signa-
ture is put in issue
(b) the signature is presumed to be genuine or authorized
except where the action is to enforce the obligation of a
purported signer who has died or become incompetent be-
fore proof is required. 7 [Emphasis supplied.]
Thus, the UCC effects a procedural change on the manner of proving valid
execution. It will no longer be necessary for the party claiming under the
signature to introduce evidence bearing on its validity if the defendant
has merely denied execution in his answer. The signature is presumed to
be genuine, and the defendant must introduce evidence if he is to prevail
with his contention that the signature is not genuine. The evidence must
justify a finding in the defendant's favor, and when this is accomplished,
the defendant has overcome the presumption. Once such evidence is intro-
duced by the defendant, the burden of establishing the signature by a
preponderance of the total evidence is on the plaintiff."
The reasoning behind the UCC provision stresses the positions of
the parties in relation to execution of the instrument. Evidence bearing on
this matter would be within the defendant's control or, at least, more
accessible to him than the plaintiff.9 This assumption establishes a more
reasonable procedure than that of the present law. Since the defendant is
the originator of the instrument in the typical situation he is more likely
to know the form that it took when made, the path that it followed, and
the parties that handled it. The plaintiff, on the other hand, would have
less information as to the execution of the instrument since he is typically
a remote party and was not involved in the original transaction. Thus,
proof of the execution and its surrounding circumstances could be handled
more easily by the defendant, and it would seem sensible that the ultimate
6 Amended Senate Bill No. 5 (1961).
7 American Law Institute Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed.
§ 3-307(1)(b) (1957).
8 American Law Institute Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed.
(1957) states the following (at pp. 281-282):
The burden is on the party claiming under the signature, but he is aided by
the presumption that it is genuine or authorized stated in paragraph (b). It
means that until some evidence is introduced which would support a finding
that the signature is forged or unauthorized, the plaintiff is not required to
prove that it is authentic.
9 American Law Institute Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed.,
251-282 (1957) also provides that: "The presumption rests upon the fact that in ordinary
experience forged or unauthorized signatures are very uncommon." Also see "Why a
Commercial Code?" 22 Tenn. L. R. 779, at 822; Report of the Virginia Code Commis-
sion on The Uniform Commercial Code 97.
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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
burden should rest on the defendant to show the forgery and not on the
plaintiff to establish genuineness.
Whereas the defendant could deny execution and prevail under the
present Ohio law without proof, the UCC requires that he proceed to
bolster his denial with substantial evidence. The new Revised Code sec-
tions do not include the comments to the UCC which explain how section
3-307(1) (b) is to work in practice.' 0 It is reasonable to assume that
the Ohio courts will adopt the philosophy of the comments, since UCC
section 1-201(31)" has been incorporated into Revised Code 1301.01(EE):
"Presumption" or "presumed" means that the trier of fact
must find the existence of the fact presumed unless and until evi-
dence is introduced which would support a finding of its non-
existence.
Compliance with this definition and its application to Ohio Revised Code
section 1303.36(A)(2) would bring about the procedural change con-
templated by the UCC.
The instant case reflects the majority viewpoint at the present time.
The doctrine works a hardship on the plaintiff because he is not an original
party to the instrument and is yet required to prove its execution. The
defendant, on the other hand, is an immediate party to the instrument and
may not have to account for its execution at all. Under a comparable set
of facts, the UCC will require the defendant to account for execution of
the note if he is to prevail. As one of the changes which will appear
with the UCC, this procedural advantage given to the plaintiff seems an
improvement over the existing law.
10 Ohio Rev. Code § 1303.36(A)(2) (1962).
11 American Law Institute Uniform Commercial Code, Text and Comments Ed.
(1957).
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